The legendary Battle of Britain represented a significant turning point in the German efforts at expansion during the Second World War. In preparation for the invasion, in the summer months of 1940, the German Air Force started massive attacks on British towns and RAF aerodromes. In this solitary defensive battle they were faced by only 700 Spitfires and Hurricanes flown by young and inexperienced pilots. On lst July 1940, RAF Fighter Command had fewer fighter planes and pilots than the Luftwaffe. Until September 1940 therefore small air defence units had been principally used in order to retain sufficient reserves. By the beginning of August the Luftwaffe had already lost over 300 aircraft in attacks on English ships and ports. However the achievement of air superiority in the airspace over the south of England was considered to be a fundamental requirement for a successful invasion. The German air force command was convinced that the RAF fighter defences could be eliminated by a battle of attrition. The aim was to force the RAF fighter squadrons into battle and destroy them. Since 1937 radar stations had been set up along the British coasts. These enabled early detection of incoming German bomber formations. The fighters were guided to the enemy by "walkie-talkie" radio. The German command underestimated the effectiveness of this system. 13th August 1940 - "Eagle Day" - marked the beginning of a series of major attacks against RAF installations, coastal radar stations and Royal Navy bases. From 7th September the focus of the bombing raids moved to the London area, primarily carried out by the He 111 and Ju 87. For the first time the attackers were countered by numerous British fighter units. After 29th October the major bombing raids against London were carried out at night. This last phase, in which night attacks were made against targets all over England, lasted until May 1941. The night attacks on Coventry in November and on 8th April 1941 were the heaviest bombing raids of the war to date. In these air attacks 27,450 civilians were killed. By the end of October 544 RAF Fighter Command had lost 544 pilots and 1,547 aircraft. By May 1941 German losses had risen to over 4,600 men and 2,200 downed aircraft. The attempt to wage a strategic war in the air with inadequate means had failed. The Fighter Command "Hurricanes" and "Spitfires" had mounted a successful defence against

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